Assuming a 12% annual interest rate, determine the present value of a five-period annual annuity of $4,100 under each of the following situations: (FV of $1, PV of $1, FVA of $1, PVA of $1, FVAD of $1 and PVAD of $1) (Use appropriate factor(s) from the tables provided.) The first payment is received at the end of the first year, and interest is compounded annually. The first payment is received at the beginning of the first year, and interest is compounded annually. The first payment is received at the end of the first year, and interest is compounded quarterly.

The uno company was formed on january 2, year 1, to sell a single product. over a 2-year period, uno’s acquisition costs have increased steadily. physical quantities held in inventory were equal to 3 months’ sales at december 31, year 1, and zero at december 31, year 2. assuming the periodic inventory system, the inventory cost method which reports the highest amount for each of the following is inventory december 31, year 1/ cost of sales year 2 a: lifo fifo b: lifo lifo c: fifo fifo d: fifo lifo

Suppose the marginal damage and marginal benefit curves in a polluted neighborhood are md = p/3 and mb = 4 – p. also, suppose that transactions costs are low, so that the consumers and the firm can bargain. we saw that in this case, the socially-optimal level of pollution is achieved. start by computing the socially-optimal p. then, for each of the following cases, compute the amount of money transferred through the bargaining process, and indicate who pays whom (i.e., whether consumers pay the firm, or vice versa). also, compute the gains to each party relative to the status quo (i.e., the starting point of the bargaining process).a)consumers have the right to clean air; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.b)consumers have the right to clean air; consumers are dominant in the bargaining process.c)firm has the right to pollute; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.d)firm has the right to pollute; consumers are dominant in the bargaining proces

Refer to the payoff matrix. suppose that speedy bike and power bike are the only two bicycle manufacturing firms serving the market. both can choose large or small advertising budgets. is there a nash equilibrium solution to this game?