Business, 21.01.2022 22:10 Thejollyhellhound20

Explain the basic concept of micro?

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Business, 22.06.2019 10:00

Scenario: you have advised the owner of bond's gym that the best thing to do would be to raise the price of a monthly membership. the owner wants to know what may happen once this price increase goes into effect. what will most likely occur after the price of a monthly membership increases? check all that apply. current members will pay more per month. the quantity demanded for memberships will decrease. the number of available memberships will increase. the owner will make more money. bond's gym will receive more membership applications.

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Business, 22.06.2019 19:00

Tri fecta, a partnership, had revenues of $369,000 in its first year of operations. the partnership has not collected on $45,000 of its sales and still owes $39,500 on $155,000 of merchandise it purchased. there was no inventory on hand at the end of the year. the partnership paid $27,000 in salaries. the partners invested $48,000 in the business and $23,000 was borrowed on a five-year note. the partnership paid $2,070 in interest that was the amount owed for the year and paid $9,500 for a two-year insurance policy on the first day of business. compute net income for the first year for tri fecta.

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Business, 22.06.2019 20:30

Almeda products, inc., uses a job-order costing system. the company's inventory balances on april 1, the start of its fiscal year, were as follows:

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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?