Waterway Incorporated began operations on January 2, 2016. Waterway employs 5 individuals who work 8-hour days and are paid hourly. Each employee earns 12 paid vacation days and 5 paid sick days annually. Vacation days may be taken after February 28 of the year in which they are earned. Sick days may be taken as soon as they are earned; unused sick days accumulate. Additional information is as follows. Actual Hourly Wage Rate 16':$14 17':$16
Vacation Days Used by Each Employee 16':2 17':10
Sick Days Used by Each Employee 16':4 17':3

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?