On December 31, Year 4, Roth Co. issued a $10,000 note payable to Wake Co. in exchange for services rendered to Roth. The transaction was not in the normal course of business. The note, made at usual trade terms, is due in 9 months and bears interest, payable at maturity, at the annual rate of 3%, a rate that is unreasonable in the circumstances. The market interest rate is 8%, the prevailing rate for similar instruments of issuers with similar credit ratings. The compound interest factor of $1 due in 9 months at 8% is .944. At what amount should the note payable be credited in Roth's December 31, Year 4, balance sheet

Which of the following is likely not a benefit of requiring a grand jury to listen to and examine all of the evidence against a person suspected of committing a serious crime and then independently deciding whether or not to hand down an indictment? 1.the grand jury system provides the accused another safeguard against being sent to trial and facing conviction based on flawed evidence. 2.the members of the grand jury are drawn from the community and are empowered to render independent decisions about whether or not the government has collected enough evidence to bring an individual to trial. 3.the grand jury’s decision can provide prosecutors insight into what is necessary to build a sufficient case if a similar crime is presented later. 4.the grand jury is impaneled to rubber-stamp prosecutors’ cases, which makes it possible for more cases to reach trial.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Circumstances under which pro-forma invoice may be used