Yards a running back rushes for during a football game are an example of which type of data?

Who has summer school : ( because i do : (

Gyou are in charge of making the work schedule for the next two weeks. typically this is not a difficult task as you work at a routine 8am – 5pm company. however, over the next two weeks you are required to schedule someone to be in the office each saturday. after contemplating this for a few days you make the schedule and assignments. before posting the schedule for everyone you decide that it is a good idea to meet personally with the two people you have scheduled to work the weekend. what do you say to them? what is your desired outcome?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?