Business, 27.07.2019 16:30 hugbug469

What is a trademark, and why might you register one?

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Business, 22.06.2019 04:50

Steffi is reviewing various licenses and their uses. match the licenses to their respective uses. you are eligible to work within the state. you are eligible to sell limited investment securities. you are eligible to sell fixed income investment products. your compensation is fee based. section 6 section 7 section 63 section 65

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Business, 22.06.2019 10:30

Perez, inc., applies the equity method for its 25 percent investment in senior, inc. during 2018, perez sold goods with a 40 percent gross profit to senior, which sold all of these goods in 2018. how should perez report the effect of the intra-entity sale on its 2018 income statement?

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Business, 22.06.2019 19:10

The stock of grommet corporation, a u.s. company, is publicly traded, with no single shareholder owning more than 5 percent of its outstanding stock. grommet owns 95 percent of the outstanding stock of staple inc., also a u.s. company. staple owns 100 percent of the outstanding stock of clip corporation, a canadian company. grommet and clip each own 50 percent of the outstanding stock of fastener inc., a u.s. company. grommet and staple each own 50 percent of the outstanding stock of binder corporation, a u.s. company. which of these corporations form an affiliated group eligible to file a consolidated tax return?

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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?