Aparticular vendor uses the following approach to intrusion detection.16 the company maintains a large number of honeypots distributed across the internet. to a potential attacker, these honeypots look like vulnerable systems. consequently, the honeypots attract many attacks and, in particular, new attacks tend to show up on the honeypots soon after— sometimes even during—their development. whenever a new attack is detected at one of the honeypots, the vendor immediately develops a signature and distributes the resulting signature to all systems using its product. the actual derivation of the signature is generally a manual process.

a. what are the advantages, if any, of this approach as compared to a standard signature-based system?
b. what are the advantages, if any, of this approach as compared to a standard anomaly-based system?
c. using the terminology given in this chapter, the system outlined in this problem would be classified as a signature-based ids, not an anomaly-based ids. why?
d. the definition of signature-based and anomaly-based ids are not standardized.17 the vendor of the system outlined in this problem refers to it as an anomaly-based ids. why might they insist on calling it an anomaly-based ids, when your well-nigh infallible author would classify it as a signature-based system?

Solution given below

Explanation:

Credit to IDS textbooks for this excerpt

a.

Most intrusion detection systems (IDS) are what is known as signature-based. This means that they operate in much the same way as a virus scanner, by searching for a known identity - or signature - for each specific intrusion event. And, while signature-based IDS is very efficient at sniffing out known s of attack, it does, like anti-virus software, depend on receiving regular signature updates, to keep in touch with variations in hacker technique. In other words, signature-based IDS is only as good as its database of stored signatures.

Because signature based IDS can only ever be as good as the extent of the signature database, two further problems immediately arise. Firstly, it is easy to fool signature-based solutions by changing the ways in which an attack is made. This technique simply skirts around the signature database stored in the IDS, giving the hacker an ideal opportunity to gain access to the network.

Secondly, the more advanced the signature database, the higher the CPU load for the system charged with analyzing each signature. Inevitably, this means that beyond the maximum bandwidth packets may be dropped. So, feeds may have to be split and then recombined after analysis, increasing complexity and cost. In addition, it means that the greater the number of signatures searched for, the higher the probability of identifying more false positives.

Also, because an attacker knows that the IDS will trigger an alarm when it detects certain attack signatures, that hacker will tend to evade the IDS by disguising the attack. For example, hackers are aware that signature-based IDS traditionally has a problem with the complexities of application interactions. This is compounded by the fact that application protocols have become increasingly complex as they expand to provide support for features like Unicode.

b.

Any organization wanting to implement a more thorough - and hence safer - solution, should consider what we call anomaly-based IDS. By its nature, anomaly-based IDS is a rather more complex creature. In fact, to use our earlier analogy, it's like our guard dog personally interviewing everyone at the gate before they are let down the drive. In network traffic terms, it captures all the headers of the IP packets running towards the network. From this, it filters out all known and legal traffic, including web traffic to the organization's web server, mail traffic to and from its mail server, outgoing web traffic from company employees and DNS traffic to and from its DNS server.

There are other equally obvious advantages to using anomaly-based IDS. For example, because it detects any traffic that is new or unusual, the anomaly method is particularly good at identifying sweeps and probes towards network hardware. It can, therefore, give early warnings of potential intrusions, because probes and scans are the predecessors of all attacks. And this applies equally to any new service installed on any item of hardware - for example, Telnet deployed on a network router for maintenance purposes and forgotten about when the maintenance was finished. This makes anomaly-based IDS perfect for detecting anything from port anomalies and web anomalies to mis-formed attacks, where the URL is deliberately mis-typed.

Anomaly testing requires more hardware spread further across the network than is required with signature based IDS. This is especially true for larger networks and, with high bandwidth connections, it is therefore necessary to install the anomaly sensors closer to the servers and network that are being monitored

c. In this case it is classified as signature based because the system has to rely on the new attacks on the honeyspots to update the signature.

building and maintaining the topology is difficult and time consuming. the chance of redundant connections is high, which adds to the high costs and potential for reduced efficiency.

explanation:

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