british strategy:
british strategy changed throughout the course of the war as the british came up against more obstacles and challenges than they anticipated.
the british strategy at the beginning of the war was simply to contain the american revolution in massachusetts and prevent it from spreading.
this proved difficult though when the british suffered devastating casualties at the battle of bunker hill in june of 1775 during the siege of boston.
after the americans captured fort ticonderoga in new york, they brought the fort’s cannons to cambridge, where they arrived on january 24, 1776, and planned to fortify the hills overlooking boston harbor in an attempt to break the siege.
american strategy:
the americans didn’t develop a real strategy in the revolutionary war until george washington took control of the continental army on july 3, 1775, although many historians are divided on exactly how strategic of a military leader washington actually was.
many 20th century historians praised washington as a brilliant military leader who followed the fabian strategy of avoiding decisive battles in order wear the enemy out, according to dave richard palmer in the introduction of the 2012 edition of his book george washington’s military genius:
“john alden, writing in the late 1960s: ‘the americans had only to keep the field until britain should tire of the struggle.’ douglas southall freeman: ‘washington’s strategy had to be patiently defensive.’ from an edited volume published in 1965: ‘the plan of the americans was the simple defensive – to oppose the british as best they could at every point, and to hold fast the line of the hudson.’ north carolina, in 1972: americans ‘did not really win the war but britain lost it mainly to circumstances rather the american enemy.’ james thomas flexner credited the patriots with creating an effective hit-and-run capability, but supported the typical view that their success sprang primarily from perseverance. russell weigley saw the american strategy as one of attrition of enemy forces, or, at best, erosion. thomas frothingham believed the necessary object of the continental army was merely to conduct operations designed to bolster partisan fighters and to ‘hold in check the superior main forces of the british. in short, the mainstream of historical writing in the latter half of the twentieth century reflected the view that american strategy in the revolutionary war was essentially one-dimensional-defensive.”
yet, other historians, such as marcus cunliffe, richard ketchum, russell weigley, douglas southall freeman and david mccullough, believed washington was no great strategist and was instead merely lucky, persistent and opportunistic.
another strategy the americans used to their advantage was the use of guerrilla warfare, which many of them had learned as soldiers during the french and indian war in the 1750s-60s, according to an npr interview by steve inskeep with author max boot:
“inskeep: now, the american revolutionaries eventually did form a regular army. but guerrilla tactics played a huge role in securing their independence. max boot sees modern lessons in that story, as told in ‘invisible armies,’ his new history of guerrilla warfare.
what were the strategies that the american rebels used when they were rebels?
boot: well, it first of all, comes down to not coming out into the open where you could be annihilated by the superior firepower of the enemy. the british got a taste of how the americans would fight on the very first day of the revolution, with the shot heard around the world, the battle of lexington and concord, where the british regulars marched through the massachusetts countryside.
and the americans did not mass in front of them but instead chose to slither on their bellies – these yankees scoundrels, as the british called them – and fired from behind trees and stone walls. and not come out until the kind of open gentleman’s fight that the british expected, and instead, took a devastating toll on the british regiment.”
boot also stated that the americans used propaganda, such as thomas paine’s common sense pamphlet, to pressure british citizens not to support a war against their american brothers, which was greatly effective in undermining support in britain for the long and costly war.
these tactics were highly effective and eventually achieved exactly what they were intended to do when the british decided to discontinue military offenses in america in 1782, although fighting didn’t formally end until 1783.
