How did appeasement lead to World War II? It allowed Germany's aggressive behavior to continue until war broke out, because it believed no nation would resist as it continued to expand its territory. It led to war as Germany became overconfident, believing it would continue to be unopposed as it annexed the low countries of Europe. It was meant to satisfy Germany's desire for more territory and avoid war, giving Poland a false sense of security and leading to the relaxation of their border defenses. It caused Britain and France to reduce their military forces to appease Germany, which took advantage of their lack of opposition to the point of ultimately forcing war.​

Appeasement in an international context is a diplomatic policy of making political or material concessions to an aggressive power in order to avoid conflict.[1] The term is most often applied to the foreign policy of the UK governments of Prime Ministers Ramsay MacDonald (in office: 1929–1935), Stanley Baldwin (in office: 1935–1937), and (most notably) Neville Chamberlain (in office: 1937–1940) towards Nazi Germany (from 1933) and Fascist Italy (established in 1922)[2] between 1935 and 1939. Appeasement of Nazism and Fascism also played a role in French foreign policy of the period.[3]

At the beginning of the 1930s, appeasing concessions were widely seen as desirable - due to the anti-war reaction to the trauma of World War I (1914–1918), second thoughts about the vindictive treatment of Germany in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, and a perception that fascism was a useful form of anti-communism. However, by the time of the Munich Pact—concluded on 30 September 1938 between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy—the policy was opposed by the Labour Party, by a few Conservative dissenters such as future Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War Duff Cooper, and future Prime Minister Anthony Eden. Appeasement was strongly supported by the British upper class, including royalty, big business (based in the City of London), the House of Lords, and media such as the BBC and The Times.[4]

As alarm grew about the rise of fascism in Europe, Chamberlain resorted to news censorship to control public opinion.[5] He confidently announced after Munich that he had secured "peace for our time".[6]

Academics, politicians, and diplomats have intensely debated the 1930s appeasement policies for more than seventy years. The historians' assessments have ranged from condemnation for allowing Hitler's Germany to grow too strong, to the judgment that Germany was so strong that it might well win a war and that postponement of a showdown was in their country's best interests. Historian Andrew Roberts argued in 2019: "Indeed, it is the generally accepted view in Britain today that they were right at least to have tried... Britain would not enter hostilities for many more months, admitting unreadiness to directly oppose Germany in combat. She sat and watched the invasion of France, acting only four years later."[7] (Compare the British role in the Battle of France in 1940.)

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Appeasement was a contributing factor to the Second World War, as this policy failed to stop Hitler from attacking and invading other countries.

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