2. shoplifting is a very serious problem for retail store owners, with millions of dollars of merchandise stolen each year. obviously, some shoplifters put clothing and other items under their clothes and then attempt to leave the store. video cameras in every bathroom and dressing room would undoubtedly reduce successful shoplifting. using rights principles of ethics, what ethical issues are raised by such action?

Luc do purchased stocks for $6,000. he paid $4,000 in cash and borrowed $2,000 from the brokerage firm. he bought 100 shares at $60.00 per share ($6,000 total). the loan has an annual interest rate of 8 percent. six months later, luc do sold the stock for $65 per share. he paid a commission of $120 and repaid the loan. his net profit was how much? pls

Tl & co. is following a related-linked diversification strategy, and soar inc. is following a related-constrained diversification strategy. how do the two firms differ from each other? a. soar inc. generates 70 percent of its revenues from its primary business, while tl & co. generates only 10 percent of its revenues from its primary business. b. soar inc. pursues a backward diversification strategy, while tl & co. pursues a forward diversification strategy. c. tl & co. will share fewer common competencies and resources between its various businesses when compared to soar inc. d. tl & co. pursues a differentiation strategy, and soar inc. pursues a cost-leadership strategy, to gain a competitive advantage.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?