Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function p = 600 – 3q. each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by cournot, stackelberg, bertrand, and collusive behavior. instruction: do not round intermediate calculations. round final answers to two decimal places for cournot values. cournot output for each firm: cournot profits for each firm: $ stackelberg leader output: stackelberg follower output: stackelberg leader profits: $ stackelberg follower profits: $ bertrand market-level output: bertrand profits for each firm: $ collusive market-level output: collusive industry-level profits: $

Horace society is planning its annual western fair raceway gala. the gala committee has assembled the following expected costs for the event: dinner (per person) $10 gaming token and program (per person) $2 prize payouts $4,300 tickets and advertising $800 private box suite rental $1,700 lottery licenses $200 the committee members would like to charge $40 per person for the evening’s activities.required: 1. what is the break-even point for the dinner-dance (in terms of the number of persons who must attend)? 2. assume that last year only 200 persons attended the dinner-dance. if the same number attend this year, what price per ticket must be charged in order to break even? 3. refer to the original data ($40 ticket price per person). prepare a cvp graph for the dinner- dance from zero tickets up to 600 tickets sold.