As a software development project manager, Chang is extremely busy working on new products as well as improving old ones and fixing the glitches in existing ones. Given the time crunch, Chang's operational philosophy for problems is to go with a solution that meets his minimum standard of acceptance. Given more time he can probably find a better solution but he believes in moving on. Which of these describes his approach?
a. Escalation of commitment
b. Optimizing
c. A representativeness heuristic.
d. A non-analytic decision strategy
e. Satisficing

The cutting department of cassel company has the following production and cost data for july. production costs 1. transferred out 12,300 units. beginning work in process $0 2. started 3,900 units that are 60% materials 62,856 complete as to conversion labor 12,622 costs and 100% complete as manufacturing overhead 23,100 to materials at july 31. materials are entered at the beginning of the process. conversion costs are incurred uniformly during the process. determine the equivalent units of production for (1) materials and (2) conversion costs. materials conversion costs total equivalent units of production link to text link to text compute unit costs. (round unit costs to 2 decimal places, e.g. 2.25.) materials $ conversion costs $ link to text link to text prepare a cost reconciliation schedule. (round unit costs to 2 decimal places, e.g. 2.25 and final answers to 0 decimal places, e.g. 1,225.) cost reconciliation costs accounted for transferred out $ work in process, july 31 materials $ conversion costs total costs $

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Oliver queen buys 100 shares of stock in green arrow archery corporation, a publicly traded company with which he is not affiliated as a director, officer, or employee. he then sells his 100 shares to john diggle. the sec sues oliver because he didn't register the sale of stock to john. who wins? oliver, because the sale falls into the nonissuer exemption oliver, because the sale falls into the private placement exemption the sec, because the transaction is not exempt from registration the sec, because even exempt transactions must be registered with the sec