QUESTION 1
The information below sets out the estimated market shares for the cellular phone manufacturing market
Market Share
36%
3%
Firm
Nokia
Fujitsu
Kyocera
LG
Motorola
Samsung
Sanyo
Siemens
Sony Ericsson
Plus 8 more firms with 1% each
3%
6%
16%
6%
4%
7%
11%
Based on this information, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is
1,272
2,216
1,836
1,800

The 2016 financial statements of the new york times company reveal average shareholders’ equity attributable to controlling interest of $837,283 thousand, net operating profit after tax of $48,032 thousand, net income attributable to the new york times company of $29,068 thousand, and average net operating assets of $354,414 thousand. the company's return on net operating assets (rnoa) for the year is: select one: a. 3.5% b. 6.9% c. 13.6% d. 18.7% e. there is not enough information to calculate the ratio.

If the economy were in the contracting phase of the business cycle, how might that affect your ability to find work?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?