How is time like money? i have to write 3 paragraphs over how time is like money.

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

The beginning inventory is expected to be 2,000 cases. expected sales are 10,000 cases, and the company wishes to begin the next period with an inventory of 1,000 cases. the number of cases the company must purchase during the month is multiple choice 9,000 cases. 10,000 cases. 11,000 cases. 13,000 cases.

Find the expected net profit of an insurance company on a health-insurance policy if: the probability of a $5000 claim is 20%; the probability of a $1000 claim is 60%; the probability of a $20,000 claim is 10%, and the probability of no claim is 10%. the company charges $4000 for this coverage. interpret your answer.